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Evolutionary games with facilitators: When does selection favor cooperation?
Mauro Mobilia1
1Department of Applied Mathematics, School of Mathematics, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, U.K.∗
We study the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynam-
ics of two-strategy (“cooperation” and “defection”) games in populations comprising cooperation
facilitators. The latter are individuals that support cooperation by enhancing the reproductive po-
tential of cooperators relative to the fitness of defectors. By computing the fixation probability of
a single cooperator in finite and well-mixed populations that include a fixed number of facilitators,
and by using mean field analysis, we determine when selection promotes cooperation in the impor-
tant classes of prisoner’s dilemma, snowdrift and stag-hunt games. In particular, we identify the
circumstances under which selection favors the replacement and invasion of defection by cooper-
ation. Our findings, corroborated by stochastic simulations, show that the spread of cooperation
can be promoted through various scenarios when the density of facilitators exceeds a critical value
whose dependence on the population size and selection strength is analyzed. We also determine
under which conditions cooperation is more likely to replace defection than vice versa.
Keywords: Evolutionary games; dynamics of cooperation; social dilemmas; fixation; population
dynamics.
PACS numbers: 05.40.-a, 02.50.-r, 87.23.Kg, 87.23.Ge
1. Introduction
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) [1–6] provides a suit-
able framework to model the evolution of cooperative be-
havior, which is a problem of paramount importance [7].
EGT is traditionally concerned with the dynamics of
competing species (strategies) in infinitely large popu-
lations where each species’ reproductive potential (fit-
ness) varies with the population composition. The se-
lection pressure is thus “frequency-dependent” and the
deterministic evolution is described in terms of ordinary
differential (replicator) equations [1–5]. The classic no-
tion of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is related to
the stability of the fixed points of the underlying repli-
cator equations: a strategy is evolutionary stable if the
fitness of those adopting it is always higher than the fit-
ness of a small fraction of mutants with an alternative
strategy. As an important consequence of frequency-
dependent selection, the fitness optimization at an indi-
vidual level may cause the reduction of the population’s
average fitness. This yields a “social dilemma”, as in
the celebrated prisoner’s dilemma game where the best
strategy for each player is to defect even if mutual co-
operation would benefit the whole population [4–6, 8].
Cooperation dilemmas can arise in other simple models,
like the two-strategy snowdrift and stag-hunt games [4–
6]. The attempt to explain the cooperative behaviors
observed in experiments [9, 10] has motivated the inves-
tigation of various mechanisms (kin and group selection,
reciprocity, local interactions) that could possibly pro-
mote the spread of cooperation [11–22].
When the size of the population is finite, evolution
is known to be affected by demographic noise. The dy-
∗Electronic address: M.Mobilia@leeds.ac.uk
namics is thus often modeled in terms of continuous-time
Markov chains and characterized by the notion of fixation
probability [4–6]. This concept refers to the possibility
that a “mutant type” takes over the entire population
and is closely related to the important concept of evolu-
tionary stability in finite populations (ESSN ) put forward
by Nowak and collaborators [23]. These authors pro-
posed that in two-player games a given strategy (say D)
is evolutionary stable in a finite population if, in addition
to having a higher fitness than the alternative strategy
(say C), the selection also opposes the replacement of D
by C. As a direct consequence, when the fixation proba-
bility of the mutant type C is higher than in the absence
of selection, the evolution favors C replacing D [4–6, 23].
In this work, we consider the evolutionary dynamics
of three important classes of two-strategy games, namely
the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), snowdrift (SD) and stag-
hunt (SH) games, where the pure strategies are “coopera-
tion” (C) and “defection” (D) and the former is supported
by the presence of a number of “cooperation facilitators”
in the population. The facilitators participate in the dy-
namics by enhancing the fitness of cooperators relative
to the reproductive potential of defectors [24]. Here, our
goal is to analyze the interplay in finite populations be-
tween selection, demographic fluctuations and facilitators
in these paradigmatic classes of evolutionary games. In
fact, it is important to understand whether selection fa-
vors cooperation, and in particular when it promotes the
replacement of defectors by cooperators [1, 2, 4–6, 23].
For instance, while selection always opposes cooperation
in the classic PD games (no facilitators), it has been
found that cooperation can spread in a special class of PD
games with facilitators [24]. For PD, SD and SH games,
we here investigate the circumstances and scenarios un-
der which selection and the presence of facilitators favor
cooperation at the expense of defection, and how these
conditions are influenced by the population size and se-
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2lection intensity. To understand when the evolutionary
dynamics promotes the spread of cooperation, we deter-
mine the critical fraction of facilitators in the population
above which selection favors the replacement of defection
by cooperation, as well as the density of facilitators neces-
sary for selection to favor cooperation invading defection.
We also identify the conditions under which cooperation
is more likely to replace defection than vice versa.
The structure of this paper is the following: In the next
section, we define the prisoner’s dilemma, snowdrift and
stag-hunt games in the presence of cooperation facilita-
tors. Section 3 is dedicated to the study of the dynamics
in finite populations and to the calculation of the fixation
probability. The circumstances under which selection fa-
vors the invasion and the replacement of defection by
cooperation are studied in Section 4-6. Our conclusions
are presented in Section 7.
2. Evolutionary games with cooperation facilitators
We study the evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy
games, that can be interpreted as social dilemmas, in
the presence of cooperation facilitators. More specifi-
cally, we consider a finite and well-mixed (spatially ho-
mogeneous) population consisting of N individuals, j of
which are cooperators (C’s) and k are defectors (D’s).
The population is also comprised of a fixed number ℓ
of “cooperation facilitators” that enhance the expected
payoff of C−players relative to the average of defectors
(see below) [24]. The pairwise interaction between C’s
and D’s is embodied in the payoff matrix and we distin-
guish three classes of games: the (i) prisoner’s dilemma
(ii) snowdrift, (iii) and stag-hunt games [1–6, 8, 25–29].
(i) The paradigmatic model of cooperation dilemma
is the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game whose generic fea-
tures are conveniently captured by the following payoff
matrix [1–6, 8] with three parameters:
( C D
C b− c −c
D b d− c
)
, (1)
where b > c > 0 and b > d > 0. The parameters b
and c respectively represent the benefit and the cost of
cooperation and, in the context of PD games, r ≡ c/b
is referred to as the “cost-to-benefit ratio” [24]. Hence,
when one player defects and the other cooperates, the
latter is “exploited” and receives a payoff −c while the
former gets b. The payoff for mutual defection is given by
d− c and can be either non-negative (c ≤ d) or negative
(c > d), but always less than the payoff (b − c) for mu-
tual cooperation and superior to the exploitation payoff
(−c). To simplify our analysis, we shall always consider
that b, c, d are all of order O(1). Defection is the only
strict Nash equilibrium (NE) of the classic (ℓ = 0) PD
games and a cooperation dilemma arises from the fact
that each individual favors defection, even though coop-
eration enhances the overall payoff of the population. In
the presence of a fixed number ℓ = N − j − k of coop-
eration facilitators, the expected payoffs of cooperators
and defectors, respectively πC/D, are inferred from (1)
according to the general principles of EGT, yielding (by
excluding self-interactions) [24]:
πC = (b− c)
(
j + ℓ− 1
N − 1
)
− c
(
N − ℓ− j
N − 1
)
πD = b
(
j
N − 1
)
+ (d− c)
(
N − ℓ− j − 1
N − 1
)
. (2)
As facilitators enhance πC by bℓ/(N − 1) and πD by
(c−d)ℓ/(N−1), their presence supports cooperation rel-
ative to defection (since b > c− d), see also (7)-(9). The
population average payoff is given by π¯ = (jπC+kπD)/N .
The fixation properties of the special subclass of PD
games with facilitators and c = d was studied in Ref. [24].
(ii) Snowdrift (SD) games are the prototypes of evo-
lutionary models exhibiting mixed evolutionary stable
strategy. The features of these anti-coordination games
are aptly captured by the following payoff matrix [1–
6, 25–27]:
( C D
C b− c d− c
D b −c
)
, (3)
where we consider that b > c + d > 0, with c > 0 and
d > 0. In its classic version (ℓ = 0), SD games are
characterized by an evolutionary stable (non-strict NE)
mixed strategy where C is played with frequency c/(c+d).
When a fixed number ℓ of cooperation facilitators is
present in the population, the expected payoffs of coop-
erators and defectors are inferred from (3):
πC = (b− c)
(
j + ℓ− 1
N − 1
)
+ (d− c)
(
N − ℓ− j
N − 1
)
πD = b
(
j
N − 1
)
− c
(
N − ℓ− j − 1
N − 1
)
, (4)
where the presence of facilitators enhances πC by (b −
d)ℓ/(N−1) and πD by cℓ/(N−1), and therefore promotes
cooperation relative to defection (since b− d > c).
(iii) Stag-hunt (SH) games are the prototype of social
contrast and trust games. Many features of these coordi-
nation games are suitably captured by the simple payoff
matrix [1–6, 28–31]:
( C D
C b −c
D b− c d− c
)
, (5)
where b > c > d > 0. In the absence of facilitators,
SH games are characterized by two strict pure NEs and
by a non-strict NE corresponding to a mixed strategy in
which C is played with frequency d/(c+ d).
In the presence of ℓ cooperation facilitators, the ex-
pected payoff of cooperators and defectors are obtained
3from (5):
πC = b
(
j + ℓ− 1
N − 1
)
− c
(
N − ℓ− j
N − 1
)
(6)
πD = (b− c)
(
j
N − 1
)
+ (d− c)
(
N − ℓ− j − 1
N − 1
)
,
where the presence of facilitators enhances πC by (b +
c)ℓ/(N − 1) and πD by (c − d)ℓ/(N − 1), and therefore
supports cooperation relative to cooperation.
For further convenience, it is useful to write the differ-
ence δπ(j) between the expected payoffs of defectors and
cooperators for the three types of games (PD, SD and
SH) as
δπ(j) = πD(j)− πC(j) = α (j/N) + βℓ, (7)
with
α =

(c− d) NN−1 (PD)
(c+ d) NN−1 (SD)
−(c+ d) NN−1 (SH)
(8)
and
βℓ =

dN−(b+d−c)ℓ+(b−d)
N−1 (PD)
b−dN−(b−c−d)ℓ
N−1 (SD),
dN−(b+d)ℓ+b+c−d
N−1 (SH)
(9)
where we have used (2), (4), (6). Since facilitators en-
hance πC relative to πD, we notice that for all the above
games δπ(j) and βℓ are decreasing functions of ℓ.
3. Dynamics, cooperation fixation probability and
evolutionary stability
In a population of finite size N , the evolutionary dy-
namics is generally described by a continuous-time birth-
death process [4, 6, 32–34], where at each time step a
pair of individuals is randomly drawn to interact and the
competition between the strategies, specified by the un-
derlying payoff matrix, is encoded in the transition rates:
if one picks a cooperator-defector pair, one of these indi-
viduals is randomly chosen for reproduction proportion-
ally to its expected payoff (or fitness) and the other is re-
placed by the newborn offspring. In each elemental move,
the population composition evolves from a state with j
cooperators to a state consisting of j ± 1 individuals of
type C. The underlying Markov chain is fully specified
by the transition rates T±j for the moves j → j ± 1, re-
spectively, with T±j=N−ℓ = T
±
j=0 = 0 to account for the
absorbing states j = 0 (no cooperators) and j = N − ℓ
(no defectors) [24]. More specifically, we here consider
the transition rates [6, 24, 26, 35–38]:
T±j =
j(N − ℓ− j)
N(N − 1)
1
1 + e±{fD(j)−fC(j)}
. (10)
In these expressions j(N − ℓ − j)/N(N − 1) accounts
for the probability of picking a cooperator-defector pair.
The probability that a C reproduces and replaces a D is
proportional to [1+ e{fD(j)−fC(j)}]−1 (and similarly for D
reproducing at the expense of C). This corresponds to
the evolution according to the so-called comparison pair-
wise “Fermi process” (FP) [5, 6, 26–31, 35–38], where fC
and fD respectively denote the cooperators and defectors
fitness. These quantities are commonly chosen to be pro-
portional to the difference between the C/D’s expected
payoffs and the average population payoff [6, 24, 26–30]:
fC/D(j) = 1− s+ s[πC/D(j)− π¯(j)], (11)
where the parameter 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 accounts for the selec-
tion strength (s = 0 and s = 1 respectively correspond
to the weak and strong selection limits) and the 1− s is
a baseline fitness contribution [6, 26, 28–31]. It has to be
noted that fC/D(j) vary with the population composition
(“frequency-dependent selection” [1–6]) and, as before,
it is useful to write the difference between fD and fC as
δf(j) = fD − fC = (s/N)[αj + Nβℓ]. It is also worth
mentioning that other microscopic update rules, like the
Moran process (MP) [4–6, 25, 26, 30, 31, 34, 39, 40],
can also be chosen. The choice of the FP is made to
simplify the analysis [(10) only depends on δf(j)], but
it is noteworthy that the FP and MP are known to
generally lead to qualitatively similar dynamics and, in
the biological relevant case of weak selection intensity
(s ≪ 1), they even predict quantitatively similar re-
sults [6, 24, 26, 30, 31, 34].
In the limit of an infinitely large population (N →∞),
with x ≡ j/N , z ≡ ℓ/N and T±j → T
±(x) and βℓ → β(z),
the random fluctuations are negligible and the dynamics
is aptly described by the mean field rate equation (RE,
after proper rescaling of time)
(d/dt)x(t) ≡ x˙ = T+(x)− T−(x) (12)
= −x(1− z − x) tanh
{s
2
(αx+ β(z))
}
.
This replicator-like equation is characterized by two ab-
sorbing fixed points, x = 0 (no C’s) and x = 1−z (no D’s),
and possibly by an interior fixed point x∗ = −β(z)/α
corresponding to the coexistence of C’s and D’s (when
0 < x∗ < 1).
When the population size is finite (N < ∞) and ran-
dom fluctuations cannot be disregarded, the evolutionary
dynamics is often characterized by the cooperation fixa-
tion probability φCj which, in the presence of ℓ coopera-
tion facilitators, is the probability that an initial number
of j cooperators eventually replace all the defectors, lead-
ing to the absorbing state consisting of N−ℓ cooperators
and ℓ facilitators. This quantity satisfies the (backward)
master equation, j ∈ [0, N − ℓ]:
T−j φ
C
j−1 + T
+
j φ
C
j+1 − [T
−
j + T
+
j ]φ
C
j = 0, (13)
with φC0 = 0 and φ
C
N−ℓ = 1. With (10), the solution of
4(13) reads (see, e.g., [4, 6, 24, 33]):
φCj =
1 +
∑j−1
n=1 exp
(
sn
2N [α(n+ 1) + 2Nβℓ]
)
1 +
∑N−ℓ−1
n=1 exp
(
sn
2N [α(n+ 1) + 2Nβℓ]
) . (14)
In particular, the fixation probability of a single cooper-
ator in a sea of N − ℓ − 1 defectors and in the presence
of ℓ cooperation facilitators is φC1 ≡ φ
C, with
φC =
[
1 +
N−ℓ−1∑
n=1
exp
( sn
2N
[α(n+ 1) + 2Nβℓ]
)]−1
.(15)
Clearly, φC = 1 when ℓ = N − 1. It has also to be noted
that in the absence of selection (s = 0), the fixation prob-
ability of j cooperators for the ensuing neutral dynamics
simply reads φCj = j/(N − ℓ), where N − ℓ can be in-
terpreted as a population size effectively reduced by the
presence of ℓ facilitators.
The notion of fixation probability is particularly im-
portant because it is closely related to the concept of
evolutionary stability in finite populations [4–6, 23], and
it allows to study under which circumstances the spread
of cooperation is favored by selection, as proposed by the
authors of Ref. [23]. This line of reasoning is readily gen-
eralized in the presence of cooperation facilitators: De-
fection is an evolutionary stable strategy in a population
of size N comprising ℓ cooperation facilitators (ESSℓN ) if
the following two conditions are simultaneously satisfied:
i. A single (“mutant”) cooperator must have a lower
fitness than (“resident”) defectors, i.e. δf(1) =
(s/N)[α+Nβℓ] > 0.
ii. For 0 ≤ ℓ < N−1, the fixation probability of a sin-
gle cooperator has to be lower than in the absence
of selection (s = 0, when there are only random
fluctuations), i.e. φC < (N − ℓ)−1.
The condition (i) ensures that selection opposes the ini-
tial spread of cooperation. Furthermore, as the fixation
of a strategy can be favored in finite populations even if
its initial increase is opposed, the condition (ii) guaran-
tees that selection opposes the replacement of defection
by cooperation.
According to Ref. [23] (see also [4, 6]), when any of the
above conditions (i), (ii) is violated, defection is not an
ESSℓN . If the condition (i) is satisfied but φ
C > (N−ℓ)−1,
selection favors the replacement but opposes the invasion
of defection by cooperators: in this case, the fixation of
C is favored even if the initial increase of C’s frequency is
opposed. This typically occurs in SH games (see Sec. 6).
On the other hand, when the condition (ii) is fulfilled but
δf(1) < 0, selection favors the invasion by cooperators
but opposes the replacement of defection by cooperation.
As we are here chiefly interested in determining when
selection promotes cooperation in the presence of facil-
itators, we need to understand when the conditions fa-
voring the invasion and replacement by cooperation are
satisfied. With the definitions (8,9) of α and βℓ, together
with (11) and (14), the invasion condition δf(1) < 0 for
which selection favors the invasion of defectors by coop-
erators reads
α+Nβℓ < 0, (16)
while the replacement condition φC > (N − ℓ)−1 under
which selection favors the replacement of defection by
cooperation (for 0 ≤ ℓ < N − 1) is
N − ℓ− 1 >
N−ℓ−1∑
n=1
enψℓ(n), with (17)
ψℓ(n) = δf(1) + sα
(
n− 1
2N
)
.
In the next sections we analyze the implications of the
conditions (16) and (17) in PD, SD and SH games. How-
ever, since (16) imposes δf(1) < 0, we can already no-
tice that (17) is automatically satisfied when the invasion
condition βℓ < −α/N is fulfilled and α ≤ 0.
Furthermore, in order to understand whether the strat-
egy C is more likely to replace D than vice versa, it may be
interesting to compare φC with the probability φD that
a single defector D takes over a population consisting
of N − ℓ − 1 cooperators C and ℓ cooperation facilita-
tors [4, 6]. Since fixation in either state j = N − ℓ or
j = 0 is guaranteed, one has φD = 1− φCN−ℓ−1 and, with
(14), one readily obtains
φD
φC
= exp
sN−ℓ−1∑
j=1
δf(j)

= exp
(
s(N − ℓ− 1)
2N
[α(N − ℓ) + 2Nβℓ]
)
.(18)
As a result, φC > φD when s > 0 and α(1− z)+ 2βℓ < 0.
In large populations (N ≫ 1), βℓ → β(z) = −αx
∗ and
one finds φC > φD if x∗ < (1 − z)/2 when α < 0, which
corresponds to C having a larger basin of attraction than
D and being risk-dominant [4, 6].
4. When does selection favor cooperation in
prisoner’s dilemma games with facilitators?
In PD games with ℓ cooperator facilitators the ex-
pected payoffs of cooperators and defectors are given
by (2), which yields the fitness difference δf(j) =
s[α(j/N) + βℓ] with α = (c − d)N/(N − 1) and βℓ =
[dN − (b+ d− c)ℓ+ (b− d)]/(N − 1).
It is instructive to first consider the deterministic mean
field limit (N → ∞, with c 6= d) in which the dynamics
is described by the RE (12). The latter is characterized
by the system’s two absorbing fixed points x = 0 (no
C’s) and x = 1 − z (no D’s). When 0 < −β(z)/α < 1,
these are separated by an interior fixed point x∗ = [(b+
d − c)z − d]/(c − d). A stability analysis of (12) reveals
various mean field scenarios:
5• If c > d and z ≤ d/(b − c + d), there is no interior
fixed point and x = 0 is the only attractor of the
RE (12). This corresponds to the situation where
there are no cooperators in the final state.
• If c > d and d/(b− c+ d) < z ≤ r, where r = c/b is
the cost-to-benefit ratio, x∗ = [(b+d−c)z−d]/(c−
d) is the only attractor of the RE (12). In this case,
the presence of facilitators leads to the coexistence
of cooperators and defectors.
• If c > d and z > r, x = 1− z is the only attractor
of the RE (12). This corresponds to the situation
where (12) predicts that defectors are replaced by
cooperators.
• If c < d and z ≤ r, x = 0 is the only attractor of
the RE (12).
• If c < d and r < z ≤ d/(b− c+ d), both x = 0 and
x = 1− z are stable and separated by the unstable
interior fixed point x∗. This situation is character-
ized by bistability and, depending on whether the
initial density of C’s is more or less than x∗, the
final state will either be x = 1− z or x = 0 [2–4, 6].
• If c < d and z > d/(b− c+ d), x = 1− z is the only
attractor of the RE (12) and this corresponds to the
eventual replacement of defectors by cooperators.
It has to be noted that the special case c = d corre-
sponds to the “equals-gains-from-switching” PD game [6]
discussed in Ref. [24].
It appears from the above discussion that the existence
and stability of x∗, as well as the sign of c − d (payoff
for mutual defection), drastically influence the spread of
cooperation. In fact, when z ≤ d/(b− c + d) there is no
interior fixed point in the case c > d whereas x∗ exists
but is unstable when c < d and z > r. According to
this mean field picture, we expect that a small number
of cooperators will quickly die out if z ≤ d/(b−c+d). It is
therefore necessary that z > d/(b−c+d) for cooperation
to be able to prevail when N → ∞. In fact, when z >
d/(b− c+d) and c < d we certainly expect that selection
favors cooperation since x = 1 − z is then the attractor
of (12). The situations where d/(b− c+ d) < z ≤ r with
c > d, and z ≤ r when c < d, are more intriguing because
(12) is thus characterized by a stable coexistence fixed
point x∗ and it is not obvious under which circumstances
cooperation will be able to replace defection. In fact,
below we show that the replacement of D by C is favored
when z > z∗ ≡ ℓ∗/N , where d/(b− c+ d) ≤ z∗ ≤ r when
c > d and r ≤ z∗ ≤ d/(b− c+ d) when c ≤ d.
Building on the insight gained from the above mean
field analysis, we now assess the combined influence of
the selection pressure and demographic fluctuations in
finite populations, by considering the invasion condition
(16) that reads z > z˜ with
z˜ ≡ ℓ˜/N =
d
b+ d− c
+
(
b+ c− 2d
b+ d− c
)
1
N
, (19)
as well the replacement condition (17) which yields
N − ℓ− 1 >
N−ℓ−1∑
n=1
enψℓ(n), with (20)
ψℓ(n) = δf(1) + s
(c− d)(n− 1)
2(N − 1)
= s
[
(c− d)(n+ 1)
2(N − 1)
+ βℓ
]
. (21)
We notice that in the limit N ≫ 1 the condition z > z˜ is
equivalent to z > d/(b+ d− c).
With (18), (8) and (9), one finds that cooperation is
more likely to replace defection than vice versa when
z >
c+ d
2b+ d− c
+
2
N
(
b− c
2b− c+ d
)
. (22)
To analyze when selection favors cooperation in PD
games with ℓ cooperators whose expected payoffs is given
by (2), one needs to distinguish the cases where the payoff
for mutual defection is negative (c > d) and non-negative.
4.1. The case of negative payoff for mutual defection
(c > d)
When there is a negative payoff d − c < 0 for mutual
defection, α > 0 and the replacement condition (20) is
generally more stringent than z > z˜ with (19).
In fact, there is generally an ℓ∗, with ⌊ℓ˜⌋ ≤ ℓ∗ ≤ ⌈Nr⌉,
such that σPD(N, ℓ) =
∑N−ℓ−1
n=1 e
nψℓ(n)− (N − ℓ− 1) < 0
when ℓ > ℓ∗ and s > 0 [41]. In finite but large pop-
ulations, when N(b − c)(c − d) ≫ 1, the replacement
condition (20) is therefore satisfied when the density
z of facilitators exceeds the critical value z∗ = ℓ∗/N ,
with z˜ ≤ z∗ ≤ r. Furthermore, with (22) one has
φC > φD in large populations when x∗ > (1− z)/2 yield-
ing z > (c+ d)/(2b− c+ d).
One thus distinguishes the following regimes:
• When z < z˜: Defection is an ESSℓN .
• When z > z˜: Defection is no longer an ESSℓN .
• When z˜ < z ≤ z∗: Selection favors the invasion
(not the replacement) of defection by cooperation.
In this regime a single cooperator is more likely to
go extinct than in the absence of selection. When
N(b− c)(c− d)≫ 1 and s > 0, one has z˜ ≤ z∗ ≤ r
(r = c/b is the cost-to-benefit ratio).
• When z > z∗: Selection favors both the invasion
and replacement of defection by cooperation.
• When z > (c+d)/(2b−c+d) and N(2b−c+d)≫ 1:
C is more likely to replace D than vice versa.
In PD games with c > d and z > 0, the replacement con-
dition (20) is more stringent than (19) and dictates when
6FIG. 1: (Color online). φC and −δf(1) > 0 vs. z = ℓ/N in
PD games with ℓ facilitators and N = 100, b = 1, c = 0.8, d =
0.2. Results of stochastic simulations (◦) for φC, analytical
prediction (15) (solid) and [N(1 − z)]−1 (dashed), while ×’s
show −κδf(1) > 0 when z > z˜ = 0.535 [κ = 1 (top) and
κ = 4 (bottom)]. Top: For strong selection intensity s = 1,
selection favors the invasion and replacement of D by C when
z > z∗ = 0.68, see text. Bottom: For s = 0.1, one also finds
z∗ = 0.68. Inset: z∗ vs. Ns with s = 10−4 − 1, N = 100 (△)
and N = 1000 (⋄); we find z∗ ≈ 0.684± 0.016.
selection favors the invasion and replacement of D by C.
It is worth noting that the critical value z∗ cannot be
inferred from the rate equation (12) or from the payoffs
(2), but is determined by the nontrivial solution of (20).
These findings are illustrated in Fig. 1 for strong se-
lection strength s = 1 and for s = 0.1. In Fig. 1, the
outcomes of stochastic simulations (obtained with the
Gillespie algorithm [42]) perfectly agree with the theoret-
ical expression (15), with φC > [N(1 − z)]−1 for z ≥ z∗
and z∗ ≤ r, as predicted by (20). The inset of Fig. 1
illustrates that the critical value z∗ ≈ 0.684 ± 0.016 is
obtained when Ns = 0.01− 1000, which indicates a very
weak influence of the selection strength on the value of
z∗.
4.2. The case of positive payoff for mutual defection
(c < d)
When the payoff for mutual defection is positive d−c >
0, one has α < 0 and ψℓ(n) < 0 when z > z˜. The
replacement condition (20) is therefore always satisfied
when δf(1) < 0 and (19) is fulfilled. This implies that
(16) is more stringent than (20) and selection favors the
invasion and replacement of D by C when z > z˜ = [d +
(b + c − 2d)N−1]/(b + d − c). Furthermore, proceeding
as in Sec. 4.1, one finds that the replacement condition
(20) is satisfied when z > z∗, where 0 ≤ z∗ ≤ r < z˜.
Moreover, with (18) one still finds that φC > φD in large
populations when z > (c+ d)/(2b+ d− c).
The invasion and replacement conditions (19) and (20)
are illustrated in Figure 2, where the theoretical predic-
tion (15) perfectly agrees with the results of stochastic
simulations, and can be summarized as follows:
• When z ≤ z∗: Defection is an ESSℓN .
• When z > z∗: Defection is no longer an ESSℓN and
r ≤ z∗ < z˜.
• When z∗ < z < z˜: Selection favors the replacement
(not the invasion) of defection by cooperation. In
this regime a single cooperator is more likely to
fixate than in the absence of selection.
• When z > z˜: Selection favors both the invasion and
replacement of defection by cooperation.
• When z > (c+d)/(2b+d−c) and N(2b+d−c)≫ 1:
C is more likely to replace D than vice versa.
The inset of Fig. 2 indicates again that the selection in-
tensity has a weak influence on the value of z∗: in Fig. 2,
one finds z∗ ≈ 0.42− 0.47 when Ns = 0.01− 1000.
It is worth noting that in the simple and special case
of “equals-gains-from-switching” PD games, with c = d,
considered in Ref. [24], one has z˜ = z∗ [43] and in this
case C is more likely to invade and replace D when z > r
and N ≫ 1, see (22), i.e. when the density of facilitators
exceeds the cost-to-benefit ratio.
We have thus shown that in PD games with ℓ cooper-
ator facilitators selection favors the invasion and replace-
ment of defection by cooperation when the fraction of
cooperation facilitators exceeds a critical value z∗ (with
z > z∗ > z˜) imposed by the replacement condition (20)
c > d. When c ≤ d, the invasion condition (16) dic-
tates that z > z˜ (with z˜ ≥ z∗) for both the invasion and
replacement of defection to be favored.
5. When does selection favor cooperation in
snowdrift games with facilitators?
The expected payoffs of SD games with ℓ cooperator
facilitators are given by (4) with b > c+d > 0. One thus
7FIG. 2: (Color online). As in Fig. 1 with parameters N =
100, b = 1, c = 0.2, d = 0.8. Results of stochastic simulations
(◦) for φC, analytical prediction (15) (solid) and [N(1− z)]−1
(dashed), while ×’s show −κδf(1) > 0 when z > z˜ = 0.4975
[κ = 0.5 (top) and κ = 1 (bottom)]. Top: For strong selection
intensity s = 1, selection favors the replacement of D by C
when z > z∗ = 0.44, see text. Bottom: For selection intensity
s = 0.1, one has z∗ = 0.43. Inset: z∗ vs. Ns with s = 10−4−1,
N = 100 (△) and N = 1000 (⋄); we find z∗ ≈ 0.42− 0.47.
has δf(j) = s[α(j/N) + βℓ], with α = (c+ d)N/(N − 1)
and βℓ = [b− dN − (b− c− d)ℓ]/(N − 1).
It is again instructive to start by considering the mean
field dynamics (12) characterized by two absorbing fixed
points (x = 0 and x = 1 − z), as well as a coexistence
fixed point x∗ = [d+ (b− c− d)z]/(c+ d) when z < c/b.
At mean field level, two regimes have to be considered:
• When z < c/b, the interior fixed point x∗ is the
only attractor of (12) that predicts the long-lived
coexistence of cooperators and defectors.
• When z ≥ c/b, the absorbing state x = 1 − z is
the only attractor of (12). This corresponds to the
situation where cooperation prevails over defection.
This analysis indicates that when the number of facil-
itators is raised from 0 to c/b, the interior fixed point x∗
is an attractor and an initial small density of cooperator
increases to reach the value x∗. Furthermore, when the
fraction of facilitators z ≥ c/b, any initial number of co-
operators grows and quickly replace all the defector. At
mean field level, it is thus clear that a fraction z ≥ c/b of
facilitators leads to a sustained level of cooperation in SD
games. This picture is significantly altered by the demo-
graphic fluctuations arising in finite populations, where
x∗ is metastable [25–27] and a careful analysis has to be
carried out to determine under which circumstances the
selection favors cooperation replacing defection.
Since the mean field analysis has revealed that in the
absence of fluctuations there is a sustained level of coop-
eration for z ≥ 0, we need to focus on the replacement
condition (17) to understand the combined influence of
selection and demographic noise. In fact, the invasion
condition (16) here yields z > z˜ = −d−1 + [(b + c +
d)/(b − c − d)]/N which simply reduces to z ≥ 0 and is
always satisfied when N(b− c− d)≫ 1.
For SD games in the presence of ℓ facilitators, the con-
dition under which cooperation is favored by selection is
thus given by (23) which here reads
N − ℓ− 1 >
N−ℓ−1∑
n=1
enψℓ(n), with (23)
ψℓ(n) = δf(1) + s
(c+ d)(n− 1)
2(N − 1)
= s
[
(c+ d)(n+ 1)
2(N − 1)
+ βℓ
]
.
One can analyze (23) as in Sec. 4 and distinguish
between the cases c ≥ d and c < d. In fact, from
(18) we infer that in large populations φC > φD when
x∗ > (1−z)/2, which yields z > (c−d)/(2b−c−d) when
c ≥ d, whereas C is always more likely to replace D than
vice versa when c < d.
The more interesting situation arises when c ≥ d and
N(b − c) ≫ 1. In this case, there is a critical fraction
of facilitators z∗, with 0 ≤ z∗ ≤ c/b, above which (23) is
satisfied and selection favors C invading and replacing D.
The replacement condition (23) and δf(1) < 0 for c ≥ d
are illustrated in Fig. 3, in which an excellent agreement
is reported between (15) and stochastic simulations: it
is found that φC > [N(1 − z)]−1 when z > z∗ ≥ c/b as
predicted by (23). The inset of Fig. 3 illustrates that the
critical value z∗ grows with the selection intensity s and
population size N as a monotonic function of the scaling
variable Ns.
When c < d and z < c/b, the coexistence fixed point is
closer to the absorbing state x = 1− z than to x = 0. In
this case, when N(d− c)≫ 1, the replacement condition
(23) is satisfied for z ≥ 0, i.e. even in the absence of
facilitators, and selection always favors the invasion and
replacement of D by C.
In summary, SD games with ℓ cooperation facilitators
are characterized by the following regimes:
• When z ≥ 0 and (b − c − d)N ≫ 1: Defection is
8FIG. 3: (Color online). φC and −δf(1) vs. z = ℓ/N in SD
games with ℓ facilitators and N = 100, b = 1, c = 0.6, d =
0.2. Results of stochastic simulations (◦) for φC, analytical
prediction (15) (solid) and [N(1 − z)]−1 (dashed), while ×’s
show −δf(1) > 0 for all values of z ≥ 0. Top: For s = 1,
selection favors C replacing D when z > z∗ = 0.28, see text.
Bottom: For s = 0.1, we find z∗ = 0.19. Inset: z∗ vs. Ns
with s = 10−4 − 1, N = 100 (△) and N = 1000 (⋄).
never an ESSℓN since δf(1) < 0 and the invasion of
D by C is favored.
• When c ≥ d and 0 ≤ z ≤ z∗: Selection favors the
invasion (not the replacement) of defection by co-
operation. In this regime, the fixation probability
of a single cooperator is lower than in the absence
of selection (s = 0).
• When c ≥ d and z > z∗, with N(c− d)≫ 1: Selec-
tion favors the invasion and replacement of defec-
tion by cooperation. The critical value z∗ ≤ c/b is
an increasing function of Ns (see inset of Fig. 3).
• When c ≥ d and z > (c − d)/(2b − c − d): C is
more likely to replace D than vice versa in large
populations.
• When c < d and N(c − d) ≫ 1: Selection favors
the invasion and replacement of defection by coop-
eration even in the absence of facilitators and C is
always more likely to replace D than vice versa, i.e.
for any z ≥ 0.
6. When does selection favor cooperation in
stag-hunt games with facilitators?
The expected payoffs of SH games (5) with ℓ coopera-
tor facilitators are given by (6), and the fitness difference
reads δf(j) = s[α(j/N)+βℓ], with α = −(c+d)N/(N−1)
and βℓ = [dN − (b+ d)ℓ+ b+ c− d]/(N − 1).
Useful information is provided by the study of the
mean field rate equation (12) characterized by an un-
stable interior fixed point x∗ = [d− (b+ d)z]/(c+ d) sep-
arating the absorbing states x = 0 and x = 1 − z when
0 ≤ z < d/(b+ d). There are two mean field regimes:
• When 0 ≤ z < d/(b+ d), x∗ exists and is unstable,
whereas x = 0 (no C’s) and x = 1− z (no D’s) are
both stable (bistability). Since x∗ < (1− z)/2, the
state x = 1−z has a larger basin of attraction than
x = 0 and C is therefore risk-dominant: (12) leads
to a state with no D’s when x(0) > x∗ [4–6, 28–31].
• When z ≥ d/(b+d), the absorbing state x = 1−z is
the only attractor of (12) whereas x = 0 is unstable
and there is no interior fixed point. This situation
corresponds to C prevailing over D.
The mean field analysis reveals that the absorbing
states are stable in SH games and separated by the un-
stable coexistence fixed point x∗ when the fraction of
facilitators is raised from 0 to z = d/(b + d). In this
situation, a small number of cooperators would quickly
die out under the mean field dynamics (12) and it is nec-
essary that z ≥ d/(b + d) for cooperation to be able to
spread in infinitely large populations.
In the absence of facilitators (ℓ = 0), SH games are
always characterized by the bistability of C and D (two
strict NEs) and, under weak selection and in populations
of large but finite size (Ns≪ 1 and N ≫ 1), it has been
shown that selection favors the the replacement of D by
C when x∗ < 1/3, which here means c > 2d, i.e. when
the basin of attraction of C is more than twice that of D
(the so-called “1/3-rule”) [4, 6, 23, 28, 30].
In SH games with cooperation facilitators, the invasion
condition δf(1) < 0 (16) leads to z > z˜, where
z˜ =
d
b+ d
+
(
b− 2d
b+ d
)
1
N
, (24)
which coincides with the mean field requirement z >
d/(b + d) when N → ∞. Moreover, the replacement
9FIG. 4: (Color online). φC and −δf(1) > 0 vs. z = ℓ/N
in SH games with ℓ facilitators and b = 1, c = 0.8, d = 0.2.
Here, x∗ = 0.2 − 1.2z. Results of stochastic simulations (◦)
for φC, analytical prediction (15) (solid) and [N(1 − z)]−1
(dashed); while the dashed-dotted lines show −κδf(1) > 0
when z > z˜ [κ = 1 (top) and κ = 30 (bottom)]. Top: When
s = 0.2 and N = 1000, z˜ ≈ 0.167, and selection favors C
replacing D when z > z∗ ≈ 0.059. Bottom: When s = 0.1 and
N = 100, selection always favors the replacement of defection
and z˜ ≈ 0.172. Inset: z∗ vs. Ns with s = 10−4 − 1, N = 100
(△) and N = 1000 (⋄); when Ns . 60, the replacement
condition (25) is satisfied even when ℓ = 0, see text.
condition (17) yields
N − ℓ− 1 >
N−ℓ−1∑
n=1
enψℓ(n), with (25)
ψℓ(n) = δf(1)− s
(c+ d)(n− 1)
2(N − 1)
= s
[
−
(c+ d)(n+ 1)
2(N − 1)
+ βℓ
]
.
Since z > z˜ guarantees δf(1) < 0 and thus ψℓ(n) < 0,
it is clear that (25) is satisfied when the invasion con-
dition (16) is fulfilled: z > z˜ is therefore more strin-
gent than (25) and dictates that selection favors the in-
vasion and replacement of defection by cooperation when
the density of facilitators in the population exceeds (24).
As a consequence, the replacement condition (25) is
satisfied when z > z∗, with z∗ ≤ z˜. Furthermore,
with (18), (8) and (9), we find that φC > φD when
x∗ < (1 − z)/2 − [(b + c + d)/(c + d)]/(2N). In large
populations (N(c+ d)≫ 1) this yields x∗ < (1− z)/2, a
condition which is here always satisfied, and therefore in
SH games (5) C is always risk-dominant and more likely
to replace D than vice versa.
Guided by the above mean field analysis and discussion
of the 1/3-rule, in our analysis we distinguish the case
where the selection strength is finite, with N ≫ 1 and
Ns ≫ 1, from the situation where the population size
is large (but finite) and the selection intensity is weak
(N ≫ 1 and Ns≪ 1).
When N ≫ 1 and Ns ≫ 1, there is a critical density
of facilitators z∗, with 0 < z∗ ≤ z˜ above which (25) is
satisfied: selection favors the replacement of defection by
cooperation when z > z∗. This is illustrated in Figs. 4
and 5 (top) where the results of stochastic simulations for
φC coincide with the prediction (15) and it is confirmed
that (25) is satisfied when z > z∗, with 0 < z∗ ≤ z˜, while
both (16) and (25) are satisfied when z > z˜. The critical
value z∗ grows with s and admits z˜ as an upper-bound.
In the insets of Figs. 4 and 5 the dependence of z∗ on
s and N is shown to be given by monotonically growing
functions of the scaling variable Ns.
When the coexistence fixed point x∗ is close to the
absorbing state x = 0 and Ns ≪ 1 one finds that
selection favors the replacement of defection even in the
absence of facilitators, as illustrated in Fig. 4 (bottom).
This can be rationalized by generalizing the 1/3-rule in
the presence of facilitators [4, 6, 23, 28, 30]. In fact, for
large populations and weak selection, when N(1−z)≫ 1
and Ns ≪ 1, one can write
∑N−ℓ−1
n=1 e
nψℓ(n) = N(1 −
z) [1 + (Ns/6)(1− z) {2d− c− z(3b− c+ 2d) +O(Ns)}].
The replacement condition (25) thus becomes
z >
2d− c
3b− c+ 2d
. (26)
Hence, when c > 2d the replacement of defectors is fa-
vored by (weak) selection for any z ≥ 0, i.e. even in the
absence of facilitators, while z∗ = (2d− c)/(3b− c+ 2d)
when c < 2d. The result (26) can also be rewritten as
the following condition on the location of the unstable
coexistence fixed point:
x∗ < 1/3− (z/9)[1 + (c/d)], (27)
where terms of order O(z2) have been neglected and the
1/3-rule is recovered when z = 0. We infer from the
inset of Fig. 4, that when Ns & 60 a density z > z∗ of
facilitators is necessary to favor the replacement of defec-
tion. In Fig. 5 (bottom), selection is found to (slightly)
favor the replacement of defectors by cooperators when
z > z∗ ≈ 0.06− 0.07 in good agreement with (26,27).
In summary, selection favors the invasion and replace-
ment of defection by cooperation in stag-hunt games in
10
FIG. 5: (Color online). As in Fig. 4 with parameters b =
1, c = 0.8, d = 0.5. Here, x∗ = (5/13)(1 − 3z). Results of
stochastic simulations (◦) for φC, analytical prediction (15)
(solid) and [N(1 − z)]−1 (dashed); while the dashed-dotted
lines show −κδf(1) > 0 when z > z˜ [κ = 1 (top) and κ = 30
(bottom)]. Top: When s = 0.2 and N = 1000, z˜ ≈ 0.33, and
selection favors C replacing D when z > z∗ ≈ 0.24. Bottom:
When s = 0.001 and N = 100, one has z∗ ≈ 0.06 and z˜ ≈
0.33, see text. Inset: z∗ vs. Ns with s = 10−4 − 1, N = 100
(△) and N = 1000 (⋄).
the presence of ℓ facilitators when the invasion condition
z > z˜, with (24), is satisfied, and one distinguishes the
following scenarios:
• WhenNs≫ 1 and z ≤ z∗: Defection is an ESSℓN .
• When Ns ≫ 1 and z > z∗: Defection is no longer
an ESSℓN . The critical density of facilitators z
∗ is
an increasing function of Ns, with 0 < z∗ ≤ z˜.
• When z∗ < z ≤ z˜: Selection favors the replace-
ment (not the invasion) of defection by coopera-
tion. In this regime, the fixation probability of a
single cooperator is higher than in the absence of
selection (s = 0). When Ns ≪ 1 (weak selection)
and N(1 − z) ≫ 1, z∗ = (2d − c)/(3b − c + 2d) if
c < 2d, while selection favors the replacement of
defectors even when z = 0 if c > 2d.
• When z > z˜: Selection favors both the invasion and
replacement of defection by cooperation.
• When N(c + d) ≫ 1 and z ≥ 0 C is always risk-
dominant in SH games (5) with cooperation facili-
tators, and more likely to replace D than vice versa
(φC > φD).
7. Conclusion
We have studied the combined influence of random
fluctuations and selection pressure on the evolutionary
dynamics of three classes of two-strategy games in the
presence of cooperation facilitators. More precisely, we
have considered the evolution of the prisoner’s dilemma
(PD), snowdrift (SD) and stag-hunt (SH) games in a
well-mixed population of size N comprising ℓ coopera-
tion facilitators. These are individuals enhancing the co-
operators’ reproductive potential (relative to defectors’
fitness). By computing the exact cooperation fixation
probability and by analyzing the mean field dynamics, we
have investigated the circumstances under which selec-
tion favors the invasion and replacement of defection by
cooperation. Invasion is favored when cooperators have
a higher fitness than defectors, whereas selection favors
the replacement of defectors when the fixation proba-
bility of a single cooperator is higher than (N − ℓ)−1
obtained under neutral dynamics. We have also deter-
mined the conditions under which cooperation is more
likely to replace defection than vice versa. Interestingly,
the invasion and replacement conditions lead to various
scenarios when the fraction of facilitators present in the
population varies. In PD and SD games, selection fa-
vors the replacement of defection by cooperation when
the density of facilitators exceeds a critical value z∗ that
depends on the model’s parameters and admits the cost-
to-benefit ratio as an upper-bound. Selection also fa-
vors cooperators invading defectors in PD games with
negative payoff for mutual defection when the density
of facilitators exceeds z∗. When the payoff for mutual
defection is positive in PD games, selection favors both
the replacement and invasion of cooperation by defection
when cooperators have higher fitness than defectors. In
SD games, defection is generally not evolutionary stable
in large populations and selection favors its invasion and
replacement by cooperation when the density of facilita-
tors is greater than z∗. In large populations, the critical
value z∗ is found to display a weak dependence on the
population size N and selection strength s in PD games,
whereas in SD and SH games z∗ grows nontrivially with
the scaling variable Ns. In SH games, the invasion and
replacement of defection is favored whenever cooperators
have a higher fitness than defectors. We have also gener-
alized the so-called 1/3-rule and shown that in SH games
the replacement of defection under weak selection occurs
when the unstable mean field coexistence fixed point is
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below a critical threshold that depends on the density of
facilitators.
These findings show that the presence of cooperation fa-
cilitators can drastically alter the dynamics of paradig-
matic models of social dilemmas via various scenarios,
and can possibly be seen as an alternative mechanism
to try and explain examples of cooperative behavior. It
would be interesting to investigate the influence of co-
operation facilitators on the evolution of spatially struc-
tured populations on complex networks, a subject that
has recently received much attention, see e.g. [5, 44–46].
[1] J. Maynard Smith. Evolution and the Theory of Games.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1982.
[2] J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund. Evolutionary Games and
Population Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press; 1998.
[3] H. Gintis. Game Theory Evolving. Princeton: Princeton
University Press; 2000.
[4] M. A. Nowak. Evolutionary Dynamics. Cambridge: Belk-
nap Press; 2006.
[5] G. Szabo´, G. Fa´th, Evolutionary games on graphs, Phys.
Rep. 2007; 446: 97 – 216.
[6] A. Traulsen and C. Hauert, Stochastic evolutionary game
dynamics, in: H.-G. Schuster (Ed.), Reviews of Nonlinear
Dynamics and Complexity Vol.2. Wiley-VCH, New York,
2010.
[7] E. Pennisi, How Did Cooperative Behavior Evolve?, Sci-
ence 2005; 309: 93.
[8] R. Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York:
Basic Books; 1984.
[9] D. Semmann, H. J. Krambeck and M. Milinski. Volun-
teering leads to rock-paper-scissors dynamics in a public
goods game. Nature (London) 2003; 425: 390–393.
[10] A. Traulsen, D. Semmann, R. D. Sommerfeld, H. J.
Krambeck and M. Milinski. Human strategy updating
in evolutionary games. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 2010;
107: 2962–2966.
[11] W. D. Hamilton. The genetical evolution of social be-
haviour. I, J. Theor. Biol. (1964); 7: 1 – 16.
[12] R. L. Trivers. The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism.
Quarterly Review of Biology 1971; 46: 35 – 57.
[13] M. A. Nowak and R. M. May. Evolutionary games and
spatial chaos. Nature 1992; 359: 826 – 829.
[14] M. A. Nowak and K. Sigmund. A strategy of win-
stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Nature 1993; 364: 56 – 58.
[15] R. Ferrie`re. Help and you shall be helped, Nature 1998;
393:517 – 519.
[16] M. Doebeli and C. Hauert. Models of cooperation based
on the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Snowdrift game. Ecol.
Lett. (2005); 8: 748-766.
[17] M. A. Nowak. Five rules for the evolution of cooperation.
Science 2006; 314:1560 – 1563.
[18] A. Traulsen and M. A. Nowak. Evolution of cooperation
by multilevel selection, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 2006;
103:10952 – 10955.
[19] A. Szolnoki, M. Perc. Reward and cooperation in the spa-
tial public goods game. EPL 2010; 92:38003-p1 – 38003-
p6.
[20] X. Chen, A. Szolnoki, M. Perc. Averting group failures in
collective-risk social dilemmas. EPL 2012; 99: 68003-p1
– 68003-p6;
[21] Z. Wang, A. Szolnoki, M. Perc. Interdependent network
reciprocity in evolutionary games. Sci. Rep. 2013; 3:1183.
[22] M. Assaf, M. Mobilia, and E. Roberts. Cooperation
dilemma in finite populations under fluctuating environ-
ments. E-print: http://arxiv.org/abs/1305.6580.
[23] M. A. Nowak, A. Sasaki, C. Taylor, and D. Fudenberg.
Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in
finite populations. Nature (London) 2004; 428: 646 – 650.
[24] M. Mobilia. Stochastic dynamics of the prisoner’s
dilemma with cooperation facilitators. Phys. Rev. E
2012; 86: 011134-1 – 011134-9.
[25] M. Mobilia and M. Assaf. Fixation in evolutionary games
under non-vanishing selection. EPL (2010); 91:10002-p1
– 1002-p6.
[26] M. Assaf and M. Mobilia. Large fluctuations and fixation
in evolutionary games. J. Stat. Mech. 2010; P09009.
[27] M. Assaf and M. Mobilia. Metastability and anomalous
fixation in evolutionary games on scale-free networks.
Phys. Rev. Lett. 2012; 109: 188701-1 – 188701-5.
[28] A. Traulsen, M. A. Nowak, and J. M. Pacheco. Stochastic
dynamics of invasion and fixation. Phys. Rev. E (2006);
74: 011909-1 – 011909-5.
[29] A. Traulsen, J. M. Pacheco, and L. A. Imhof. Stochastic-
ity and evolutionary stability Phys. Rev E (2006); 74:
021905-1 – 021905-5.
[30] B. Wu, P. M. Altrock, L. Wang, and A. Traulsen. Univer-
sality of weak selection. Phys. Rev. E 2010; 82:046106-1
– 046106-11.
[31] P. M. Altrock and A. Traulsen. Fixation times in evolu-
tionary games under weak selection. New J. Phys. 2009;
11: 013012-1 – 013012-19.
[32] C. W. Gardiner. Handbook of Stochastic Methods. New
York: Springer; 2002.
[33] N. G. van Kampen. Stochastic Processes in Physics and
Chemistry. Amsterdam: Elsevier; 1997.
[34] A. Traulsen, J. C. Claussen, and C Hauert. Coevolution-
ary dynamics: From finite to infinite populations. Phys.
Rev. Lett. 2005; 95: 238701-1 – 238701-4.
[35] L. E. Blume. The statistical mechanics of strategic inter-
action. Games Econ. Behav. 1993; 5: 387 – 424.
[36] G. Szabo´ and C. To¨ke. Evolutionary prisoners dilemma
game on a square lattice. Phys. Rev. E 1998; 58: 69 – 73.
[37] C. Hauert and G. Szabo´. Game theory and physics. Am.
J. Phys. 2005; 73: 405 – 414.
[38] A. Traulsen, J. M. Pacheco, and M. A. Nowak. Pair-
wise comparison and selection temperature in evolution-
ary game dynamics. J. Theor. Biol. 2007; 246: 522 – 529.
[39] P. A. P. Moran. The statistical processes of evolutionary
theory. Oxford: Clarendon; 1962.
[40] T. Antal and I. Scheuring. Fixation of strategies for an
evolutionary game in finite populations, Bull. Math. Biol.
2006; 68: 1923 – 1944.
[41] Since ψℓ(n) given by (21) increases with n and decreases
with ℓ, while ψ⌊ℓ˜⌋(n) ≥ 0 and ψ⌈Nr⌉(n) ≤ 0 when
N(b − c)(c − d) ≫ 1, one obtains σPD(N, ⌊ℓ˜⌋) > 0
12
and σPD(N, ⌈Nr⌉) < 0. One therefore generally has
σPD(N, ℓ) < 0 for ℓ > ℓ
∗, where ⌊ℓ˜⌋ ≤ ℓ∗ ≤ ⌈Nr⌉, as
confirmed in Figs. 1 and 2.
[42] D. T. Gillespie. A general method for numerically simu-
lating the stochastic time evolution of coupled chemical
reactions. J. Comput. Phys. 1976; 22: 403 – 434.
[43] For the subclass of “equals-gains-from-switching” PD
games (c = d) with ℓ cooperation facilitators, defection
is evolutionary stable when δf(1) > 0, whereas the con-
ditions z > z˜, with (19), and (20) for the invasion and
replacement of D by C are simultaneously satisfied when
δf(1) < 0. In “equals-gains-from-switching” PD games
with cooperation facilitators, using (19), selection is thus
found to favor cooperation when z− r > (1− r)/N , with
r = c/b and z = ℓ/N ; and the condition (17) of [24] is
too restrictive. Some remarks from J. Miekisz that con-
tributed to clarify this point are acknowledged.
[44] M. Perc and A. Szolnoki. Coevolutionary games a mini
review, BioSystems 99 (2010) 109-125.
[45] P. Shakarian, P. Roos, and G. Moores. A review of evo-
lutionary graph theory with applications to game theory.
BioSystems 2012; 107: 66 – 80.
[46] M. Perc, J. Go´mez-Garden˜es, A. Szolnoki, L. M. Flor´ıa
and Y. Moreno. Evolutionary dynamics of group inter-
actions on structured populations: a review. J. R. Soc.
Interface 2013; 10:20120997.
